[This
piece is adapted from an old paper I did on the document in the title. Years
later, William Patterson’s We Charge
Genocide still bothers me because I imagine the charges to be true of a country I once, foolishly, held in high esteem.]
In
1951, a document entitled We Charge
Genocide by William Patterson was written and presented to the United Nations that seeks to indict the United
States government for genocide, claiming the United States government played,
at the very least, some kind of implicit role in this crime against its Negro
citizens. [Note that Patterson uses the word “citizen” and not the word
“population.”] Patterson submitted his document to the United Nations at the
time under the terms and conditions expressed in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide as
agree upon by the United Nations in 1948. Given the high moral ground many
United States citizens undoubtedly believe their country occupies, such a
charge may appear contemptible. However, it’s impertinent to dismiss such a
charge forthwith; evidence must be examined to determine whether or not the
charge brought forth by Patterson has any merit.
Patterson begins his text by appealing
to the responsibility inherent in his patriotism; bringing forth the charge of
genocide is unfortunate but he feels it is something he must do, citing
Hitler’s Germany as an example of what happens to a country when its racism
goes unchecked. Patterson declares that this leads not just to genocide at home
but to predatory war abroad as well. These are possible consequences that
Patterson is not prepared to live with and he is incredulous with those that
are. He claims that the United States government, in regard to its Negro
population, “Seldom has mass murder on the score of ‘race’ been so sanctified
by law.” Patterson notes that such an insidious act cannot go unnoticed no
matter how justified by judicial decree. Nor can genocide be disguised by any
appeal to a ‘high moral purpose.’
Even
though Patterson’s introduction is justifiably laden with subtle anger, he must
prove the charge: Is the United States government guilty of genocide (or
attempted genocide)? Patterson recites the definition of genocide from Article
II of the Genocide Convention, and claims there has indeed been a systematic
intent by the United States government to destroy its Negro population either
in part or in whole, citing a number of groups – some governmental, some
semi-governmental, and others public – involved in this attempt. In order to
achieve their ends, Patterson alleges a number of methods these groups use, the
most obvious of which is physical harm but also through trumped up criminal
charges and bureaucratic avenues. Often, Negros are prevented from voting and
regularly denied the rights afforded to them by the Constitution of the United
States. Furthermore, Patterson claims to have proof of an economic genocide
which is allegedly designed to deny a sufficient means of living to Negro
people, a practice which often results in a shortened life span for Negros and
is accompanied by a high infant mortality rate.
The proof Patterson says will be
submitted in his document is undeniably incriminating, for the evidence comes
straight from, “…their own mouths, their own writings, their political
resolutions, their racist laws, and from photographs of their own handiwork.”
Such evidence, it is implied, is to be so damning as to be overwhelming.
Moreover, such evidence is so pervasive that it has resulted in an attempt at
genocide that is more understood than deliberately stated among non-Negros.
This ‘understanding,’ Patterson alleges, comes via generations of the
oppressor’s modus operandi as to be a
matter of inherency. It is not possible, Patterson insists of the 10,000 or
more murdered Negros, for there to
be so
many victims of genocide in
the United States without some
level of assistance by the country’s government. Patterson does not mince words
here; he intends to demonstrate that a conspiracy to commit genocide exists
within the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches of the United States
government.
Patterson writes that these charges
must be brought forth because Negros are in fact human beings whom he states
are being denied their human rights, whose basic humanity is mocked. This is
more than an allegation; Patterson offers proof of the very words recorded by congressmen
in the halls of Congress to this very effect. The charge of genocide is made
all the more imperative as the murder of Negros moves beyond the lynchings of
white supremacists to a policy of murder adopted by police, an institution
recognized as a branch of the government.
From there, Patterson offers an
abridged summary of the kinds of cases that demonstrate a conspiracy to commit genocide
that is prevalent throughout the United States. First, Patterson briefly recaps
no less than twenty-one instances in which Negro citizens were murdered at the
hands of police officers, almost half of which were already in custody at the
time of their murders. Second, Patterson recaps another twenty-one cases in
which murders occurred via arson or other acts of whites aspiring to violence,
or from a willful neglect of medical institutions (run by whites) to treat
injured Negros. All these cases point towards a policy of mass murder with
nothing other than the victim’s ethnicity to serve as a catalyst for those
murders. Patterson claims these cases often have their origins in the attempt
to prevent Negros from voting.
Patterson feels the attempt to keep
Negros from voting is intimately linked to an attempt to
deny Negros their rights
as citizens in
accordance with the United States Constitution. He cites the
state of South Carolina as an example of a state in which then Governor James
E. Byrnes openly declared that he would rather eliminate the state’s school system
than allow desegregated schools. Worse, Patterson submits the very words of one
former governor, Strom Thurmond, from a handbook on States Rights in which a
declaration of violence is mandated should it become necessary to protect white
business owners should Negros be allowed to vote. Patterson also recalls the
words recorded by Senator Allen Ellender, whose message to the United States
Senate in 1948 was laden with racism and an implicit order to prevent Negros
from voting.
The instances where violence is more
explicitly mandated can clearly be seen in semi-governmental organizations such
as the Ku Klux Klan. Such organizations, Patterson claims, are often chartered
by the states they operate in, sometimes even incorporated into those state’s
government. It was also not atypical for police officers to belong to these
organizations and participate in their activities.
Physical harm to Negros is but a part
of the larger problem; mental harm bodes as well which violates the “mental
harm” clause of the Genocide Convention forbidding such actions. Here,
Patterson quickly recaps seventeen instances in which psychological terror was
used to intimidate Negros, typically to prevent Negros from voting. While it is
not always the case that Negros come to physical harm, Patterson states, they
are never free from the psychological terror aimed at them particularly in, but
not limited to, the Southern states.
Patterson indicates that the practice
of genocide in the United States is located primarily in
America’s southern states,
a region commonly
referred to as ‘The Black Belt.’ This is due to the South as the former
epicenter of the slave trade. While slavery may have since been abolished,
Negros still faced racism inherited by the subsequent generations of former
plantation owners. This resulted in virtually non-existent political and
economic rights for Negros. Naturally, this has been to protect the profits of
plantation owners, Patterson writes, whose credit is advanced by the United
States’ largest banks. Patterson concludes then that the foundation for
genocide in the United States is economic and writes, “It is genocide for
profit.” Assuming genocide was indeed practiced during slavery, Patterson does
not think genocide ended alongside the abolition of slavery. As Patterson
writes it, it appears genocide is as present as ever as Negros struggle to
obtain rights for themselves.
The situation needn’t have been so
dire. Patterson signifies there had been a short time – from 1868 when the 14th
Amendment was passed until 1876 when Republican President Hayes was elected –
when the 14th and 15th Amendments were actually enforced.
However, the Republican Party, who had been on the side of Negro rights,
appeared to abandon Negros in order to secure the votes of the (former)
Southern slave owners so the President Hayes might be elected. This had the
effect of terror being unleashed upon Negros once more, resulting in “1,955
recorded lynchings from 1889 through 1901” alone. Segregation laws followed in
short-order. Spurious criminal charges rose exponentially as well. Come 1900,
Patterson points to Senator Tillman’s statement on the floor of the Senate, in
which Tillman stated that he was not ashamed to have killed and rigged
elections against Negros.
This
pattern still persists, Patterson writes of the situation in 1951. This is due
in part to the unpopular Korean War which involves a repression of the public
by the government in order to maintain support and profits from the war. If
Negros are advocates for peace, the government in this case must silence them.
[Patterson does not say why Negros would advocate peace in this instance, but
intimates that it is because they are traditionally targets of violence.]
Politicians and industrialists must silence Negros, too, if they are to
maintain power and profits. Thus Patterson insists that the United States has
practiced genocide to those ends.
Patterson believes his case is strong
because it is true. That is exactly the question before us now: Has the United
States government actively engaged in genocide against its Negro citizens? We
must analyze the evidence before we pass judgment.
First, we shall take into
consideration whether or not Article II of the Genocide Convention was
violated, whether there were “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole
or in part” an ethical group as such. Without question, Negros had been
targeted for violence and murder based upon their ethnicity. But Patterson has
to submit evidence that there was a conspiracy to commit genocide within the
government of the United States.
This is no small task. Patterson
himself was aware of this, admitting in his opening paragraphs that the
conspiracy to commit genocide is actually more deadly “in that it is sometimes
understood rather than expressed” among the perpetrators. Unfortunately, there
is no way to prove such an understanding among people; we do not know the minds
of others. Such an admission is a double-edged sword; would the General
Assembly of the United Nations then see the evidence within this document
as a matter of interpretation, which
would soften Patterson’s case, or will the depths to which such genocidal
practices are ingrained within the perpetrators be obvious? Patterson is
gambling on the latter, hoping that his honesty in making this admission would
buy his case credibility. But again, this is a gamble in which Patterson is
betting that the urgent plight of the Negro people would resonate within the
halls of what is ultimately a political arena, an arena that is not known for
its deference to emotion, much less reason.
Patterson
makes a second potentially damaging admission in respect to his case, the fact
that much of the evidence has been garnered from Negro sources. Such an
admission could possibly present a biased perspective of the petitioners.
However, perhaps Patterson felt justified making such an admission because the
evidence is sufficient to implore the United Nations to investigate the matter
further. Forthcoming as Patterson might be, it is another large gamble. With
the United States as part of the United Nations with whom other countries
involved with the United Nations have a political stake in, it is difficult to
think that Patterson actually believes the United Nations would vote without
hesitation to investigate the matter any further.
Having gotten beyond these admissions,
Patterson began to offer some typical cases as evidence. Yet all the typical
cases Patterson provided in the instances of killings by police do not indicate
any systematic destruction. The best we can say of the twenty-one cases of
police brutality is that they are all isolated incidences with no recognizable
pattern or methodology of murder among the killers. Motivations, weapons,
geography, and situations appear to vary in all of Patterson’s cases. The only
thing typical of these cases is that a Negro was killed, where Patterson
assumes the innocence of the deceased Negro. Patterson says of the cases
where the involved police officer has been charged with a possible crime, they
are always exonerated. The problem is that we don’t know why. Racism may likely
be involved, but such a fact alone does not indicate genocide.
Patterson goes on to cite more typical
cases. In the cases that did not involve police brutality, Patterson contends
there were murders of Negros via acts of arson or other general acts of whites
aspiring to violence, or from a willful neglect of medical institutions. As
before, these all appear to be isolated incidents with no way to prove
otherwise. Although some of these acts involve preventing Negros from voting
and we today may feel such a motivation to be abhorrent, this does not amount
to the United States government seeking the murder of all Negros.
But
does it amount to the genocide of Negro people ‘in part’? Lawyer Raphael Lemkin
raises a good point in relation to this question in his letter to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee in which Lemkin says that local terrorism is meant
not to kill Negros in whole or in part, but to preserve them on a different
(lower) level of existence. Of course, this is not an endorsement of murder; it
is just a possible, maybe even likely, explanation of the situation.
However, these words by Lemkin
inadvertently raise another issue, that there was indeed a system, or at least
a basic policy in the South, to terrorize Negros so that they should understand
their place in society, so to speak. While Lemkin notes that the Genocide
Convention does not deal with individual cases, it does not appear to be of any
great cognitive leap to think that there exists at the very least an
understanding among whites, particularly in the South, to terrorize Negros.
This systematic terror then arguably violated the “mental harm” clause of the
Genocide Convention, although who is to be held accountable for this violation
is debatable. If the United States government knew about and allowed the terror
to take place, what government official should be accountable?
To this end, Patterson offered up the
words of elected government officials who, if nothing else, intended to prevent
Negros from voting or exercising any rights mandated by the United States
Constitution. Did a governor of South Carolina declare that he would rather
abolish the State’s schools rather than allow integration? Yes; such a
declaration has been recorded. Did the governor of Georgia incite other to
violence against Negros in 1949? Yes; that too, is on the record. Did Governors
Thurmond, Wright, and Dixon approve a political handbook in which violence is
endorsed against Negros so that Negro people cannot exercise their civil
rights? Yes; this also is a matter of recorded history. Was the militant racist
organization the Ku Klux Klan ever incorporated or charted by a state
government? Often. In fact, the United Sons of Dixie, a Klan-like organization
that was incorporated in Tennessee in 1943, stated in its oath, “Eventually we
must eliminate the Negro from this country.” Even if this evidence did not in
some way indicate an intent to commit genocide, it certainly speaks of an
intent to terrorize, although perhaps by a minority of states and not
representative of the United States as a whole. Even so, we should not think
this alleviates the federal government of any responsibility in the matter.
If the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution is binding upon all states in its republic, then
it is appropriate to hold the entire United States government responsible
if any treaties signed by the United States government are violated since they
are the law of all the land. With genocide a notoriously difficult accusation
to prove, the intent to terrorize Negros in the United States appears a much
easier charge to demonstrate. To that end it appears Patterson had a legitimate
case. Thus, the United States government can and should have been held
accountable for violating the “mental harm” clause of the Genocide Convention. We
can daydream that some day they will be held accountable, though we should not
imagine this as a likely scenario given the lack of moral depth with which the
United States government seems to operate even now.
On a personal note, I found this historical
document resonating deeply given just these instances of the United States
government’s questionable moral practices. As a child, I recall believing that
I lived in a world in which my native country held themselves to the highest
moral standards and pursued noble goals. However, that the United States does
not recognize the International Criminal Court’s authority over its citizens to
this day is but another instance among so many in which a child has learned how
terribly incorrigible his uncle has been.
