Sunday, April 19, 2015

The Absurdity of the Ontological Argument



The Ontological Argument is accredited to St. Anselm (1033-1109) and is formulated as such: God is “something than which none greater can be conceived;” or, God is the most perfect being that can be thought of. Anselm adds to this formulation a caveat—if God exists only in our minds, than a being greater than God can be thought of that exists in reality. For Anselm, to think of something being greater than God is impossible since, for Anselm, existence is a requirement for anything to be perfect. Thus, God must exist; “And certainly it exists so truly that it cannot be thought of as not existing.”



The greatest weakness of Anselm’s argument is that the word “perfect” is ambiguous, if not altogether vague. Epistemologically, we cannot verify that any concept that anyone has of perfection is indeed perfect. If we argue that human beings are inherently imperfect creatures (as the traditional Judeo-Christian interpretation of human beings maintains) it would seem to follow that they are incapable of thinking of anything as perfect. If we consider for a moment that each culture has relative standards of perfection (to say nothing of individuals), it seems that the Ontological Argument could just as well be a proof for polytheism, not just monotheism. That is, the Ontological Argument is not an argument for any particular god. Obviously, in considering his own culture as more perfect that any other, Anselm never considered this as a possibility.



It should also not go unnoticed how it seems Anselm arbitrarily requires existence for something’s perfection, meaning, we don’t know if he’s left out some additional requirement or if there is a requirement more important than existence that he’s neglected to mention or think of. We cannot be certain that perfection requires a thought-of object to actually exist, particularly when we have no experience with perfect things in our own experiences (low standard for perfection notwithstanding).



Our lack of experience with perfect things highlights a lesser observed problem with Anselm’s argument, namely that for something to exist is to place limitations upon the existent object. While the Abrahamic god is often given as a being “without limitation,” no one has definitively defined what “without limitations” actually means. In actuality, it doesn’t mean anything because we have no concept of things that do not have boundaries. To do so is an attempt to conceptualize nothingness, and we characterize nothingness as the space between objects and their inherent boundaries.



Fourth, as pointed out by the clever Austrian philosopher Douglas Gasking, an ontological argument can be used to show that God does not exist:



1.  The creation of the world is the most marvelous achievement imaginable.

2. The merit of an achievement is the product of (a) its intrinsic quality, and (b) the ability of its creator.

3. The greater the disability (or handicap) of the creator, the more impressive the achievement.

4. The most formidable handicap for a creator would be non-existence.

5. Therefore if we suppose that the universe is the product of an existent creator we can conceive a greater being - namely, one who created everything while not existing.

6. An existing God therefore would not be a being greater than which a greater cannot be conceived because an even more formidable and incredible creator would be a God which did not exist.

7. God does not exist.



Lastly, we should consider our own existence and the existence of others for a moment. We exist yet we are not perfect. There is no reason to assume that any existent being who is more moral, more powerful, and/or more intelligent than us qualifies as perfect (even if they are closer to perfection as they exhibit these qualities). If perfection indeed requires existence and we know for certain that we exist, as opposed to a hypothetical god, it might be that we are more perfect than God by virtue of existence.

Saturday, April 18, 2015

Judith Thompson's In Defense of Abortion



In defending her view that abortion is at least some times permissible—in cases of rape or in instances when the mother’s life is endangered by her pregnancy, for instance—Judith J. Thompson advances a number of analogies to support her position. In 1971’s A Defense of Abortion, her analogies support her position by conceding the Argument from Personhood and instead attack the premise of a fetus’ right-to-life.

Thompson’s first analogy is to compare an unwanted pregnancy due to rape to one of us being kidnapped and having us wake up to find a famous violinist attached to us so that the violinist may use our kidneys to live. Thompson’s question is to ask us if it is morally required of us to consent to our newfound condition. In quoting the hypothetical doctor in her scenario, Thompson writes, “Violinists are persons. Granted you have a right to decide what happens in and to your body, but a person’s right to life outweighs your right to decide what happens in and to your body.” Our intuition is that this is preposterous and indicates there is something wrong with the right-to-life premise. This is because we generally believe we are not morally obligated to aid someone against our will, particularly when that aid requires an undue burden. As it applies to this analogy, being forced to let the violinist to use our kidneys for one hour is not an undue burden in the way that being forced to let the violinist use our kidneys for nine months is. (There have been cases where a pregnant woman alleges she didn’t know she was pregnant before birth or for months after being impregnated. This wouldn’t seem to count as a burden if someone didn’t know they were being burdened.) Nonetheless, having even one hour of kidney use be forced upon us would be a violation of our negative [unalienable] rights, if we are inclined to believe in such rights. Perhaps Thompson could have also argued for an undue burden insofar as the rape victim being reminded every day of her ordeal. This would strengthen the argument for allowing abortion in instances of rape.

In instances when the mother’s life is endangered due to a pregnancy, Thompson compares this to being trapped in a very tiny house with a rapidly growing child. If we do not take action, we’ll be crushed to death by the child. Earlier in her article, Thompson concedes that two lives may be equal in value, but hints that this equality does not necessarily exclude one’s right to self-defense. Thompson says that here, the proponents of a fetus’ right to life are wrong to equate the mother’s life with “the status of a house, to which we don’t allow the right of self-defense. But if the woman houses the child, it should be remembered that she is the person who houses it.” However, Thompson is careful to acknowledge that there are limits to self-defense but that this circumstance is special, being that both persons are innocent and in a situation neither has willed. For this reason, Thompson thinks it is understandable not to let a third party intervene, but the person whose life is threatened can. Unfortunately, Thompson doesn’t address the vital question of who, if anyone, is allowed to defend the defenseless, especially when she has conceded that a fetus is a person. If the situation is such that one person has the ability to “defend” themselves and the other does not, her analogy suffers.

Finally, Thompson defends abortion for those who have taken reasonable precautions against pregnancy. She makes a comparison between (presumably reliable) birth control methods and leaving a window open in a stuffy room through which a burglar climbs. “It would be absurd to say, ‘Ah, now he can stay, she’s given him the right to use her house—for she is partially responsible for his presence there, having voluntarily done what enabled him to get in.’” Abortion would be permissible in this case according to Thompson in order to preserve the quality of a woman’s life which, we presume, includes having sex for pleasure. This argument would give an unborn person a right to life so long as the potential mother took no precautions along with the understanding that having sex might result in a pregnancy. This would constitute a willful act on part of the woman and such intentions are where a fetus’ right-to-life would arise from. Proving a mother took no precautions along with the understanding that having sex might result in a pregnancy may be difficult, however. Thompson’s attempt to preserve a woman’s right to a certain quality of life hinges on the notion that it is permissible for woman to have sex for pleasure, a notion not widely entertained outside of Western cultures.

Thompson defends abortion on the grounds that a fetus’ right-to-life is suspect on a number of accounts, though some of those accounts are clearly stronger than others. Foregoing the Argument from Personhood, Thompson built an interesting case against a prohibition on abortion. If nothing else, Thompson taught us to go beyond the Argument from Personhood to see if there are any grounds for allowing abortion. It appears there may very well be.

Wednesday, April 1, 2015

Independence From Religion Day



Christians have apparently forgotten what it is like to be persecuted.

Michigan, Mississippi and a spate of other states already had a similar law in place. Indiana, Virginia and now Arkansas have just passed an anti-gay/pro-discrimination law as well. The
Rallying against hate.
difference, though, is that Indiana and Virginia, for example, doesn’t have any laws that protect LBGT’s as a class. As Addictedinfo.org reports on Virginia (and basically pertains to Indiana also), “The state of Virginia is set to pass a law which would allow anti-LGBT business owners to bar gay people, purely on the basis of their sexuality. The Virginia Bill states that anyone seeking or holding a business license from the state of Virginia in the state can refuse service or entry to gay people, on the grounds it ‘would violate the religious or moral convictions of such person with respect to same-sex marriage or homosexual behavior.’”

Seriously.
It is legalized discrimination meant to protect business owners who are also Judeo-Christian from catering to gays, though we all know that in reality the laws may eventually extend to anyone a business owner doesn’t like (and they will be able to invoke ‘religious objection’ in their defense). To be clear, I do think that a business owner should be able to deny a person service provided there is a good reason, where ‘a good reason’ is one grounded in reality. (That is to say being a religious Jew, Christian, or Muslim is not grounded in reality.) While those of us in the good ol’ U.S. of A. with any semblance of sanity or aren’t insane about inflicting our exclusionary beliefs on others can talk and give lip-service to how terrible these laws are, no one is doing much of anything about it. Sure, there have been street protests and several companies have bailed on planned expansions into Indiana, for example, but I don’t think it is enough. The people creating and passing these laws simply don’t understand how hateful they are being, where being hateful is simply primitive at this point in human history.

It is no longer acceptable. But you cannot reason with the kind of people who support these laws, the kind of people who, say, claim to be Christians but don’t act anything like Jesus. Take the Indiana Gov. Mike Pence for instance, who complained in an interview of, "an avalanche of intolerance that has been poured on our state" but seemed not to understand that what he’s done is allow the government to sanction just that, intolerance. You can only make such people understand by demonstrating what it is they are doing to people when they deny a person basic human rights. You can only hope to make them understand by putting them through the very thing they insist on doing to other people. That being the case, I am calling for a national day of protest, a day in which Christians are denied services by non-Christians based, of course, on ‘moral objections.’ Without getting into the particulars of my system of ethics, let’s just say I find the morality of Judeo-Christians quite disturbing. Why shouldn’t I, or anyone else with a different system of ethics – one based on science since science is apparently a religion to the Christian right-wing – deny Christians service based on a ‘moral objection’?

Unfortunately, Easter is too close to raise awareness of and organize such a protest. My solution is to make July 4, 2015 in the U.S., America’s Independence Day, Independence From Religion Day* by being intolerant of the religiously inclined and invoking a ‘moral objection’ as the reason for denying certain people services. On a day that is only allowed to be celebrated by straight Judeo-Christian patriots – since you’re not a patriot if you’re not a straight Judeo-Christian – I say we hold what is the social equivalent of the Boston Tea Party; the rest of us are going to take the rights straight Judeo-Christians take for granted and throw them overboard. Extremist straight Judeo-Christians need to be shown that freedom from religion in just as important as the freedom of religion.

[Sorry, can’t think of a catchier title at the moment.]

This was a lifetime ago! And today?
I will admit that this seems like a rather extreme measure to take but ‘extreme’ is the only thing extremist straight Judeo-Christians understand. There is only a shred of hope that the people who wish to legally discriminate can come to see that Independence Day really should be called ‘Interdependence Day;’ America has long suffered from a fractured psyche (in no small part due to the Reagan Years) and it is time to re-establish a national identity. These discriminatory laws cannot accomplish that. Making bullies understand what they are doing by showing them how it feels is the only possible hope in putting the U.S. back on the road to unity. Okay, okay, not that the U.S. was ever really unified – some group somewhere was always getting the shaft – but few will argue that the U.S.’s current national identity isn’t like Dr. Jeckyl and Mr. Hyde at best. The sane among us cannot stand idly by and let religious lawmakers create laws in their favor. And so the sane among us have no good recourse but to deny their kind service.

Certainly there will be practical difficulties. For instance, it is not always immediately clear who is and who isn’t a religious wing-nut. In cases where it is known, servicing a religious person should be politely declined and the reason for denying service given; “I’m sorry Mr. White, but I morally object to the nature of your ethics and therefore cannot in good conscience serve you today.” There is also the matter of whether to deny service to religious people who are not dicks, which in actuality would be most religious people (in my experience). Should those people be denied service? For the sake of consistency, I would have to say ‘yes’ as doing so would result in the situation being recanted to the denied party’s family and friends who are also likely to be religious. While I don’t like the idea of there being ‘collateral damage,’ no good revolution has come about without some innocent ‘blood’ getting spilled.

The year is 2015. Americans are not dirt-snorting, cave-dwelling misogynist towelheads that like to behead people for petty reasons. Some people should stop acting like that’s what they want to be, or if they want to, be that person somewhere else. The U.S. is no longer the place for you.