The Non-Dualism of Samkara

[Samkara (c.700 CE) was an Indian Brahmin who is regarded by many as the most authoritative Hindu thinker of all time. He was primarily a commentator on the sacred texts of the Vedas and a teacher of the Advaitin branch of Vedanta philosophy. Unlike monotheism, which has its roots in a mind-body dualism, Samkara maintained there is no such dualism.]

Throughout Samkara’s various treatises, Samkara argues in favor of a metaphysics that is non-dualistic. Herein, we shall examine why; are his appeals based upon reason, are they an appeal to scriptural authority, or an appeal to experience? Does he argue based upon multiple appeals? In order to find out, we must begin (and end) with the equation of Atman with Brahman, seeing how it is clear from Sengaku Mayeda’s transcripts of the Upadesasahasra that there is no difference between Atman and Brahman. However, because no philosophy can be straightforward, this is not the same as saying they are the same thing.

First, we must understand what Brahman is. Samkara held Brahman as the unifying, highest reality, a reality free of qualities that is manifest in both the physical world and one’s absolute identity (ultimately Atman, which will be discussed shortly). Brahman is formless and is neither existent nor non-existent. Thus, Brahman is the totality of all there is. This view is taken from various scripture that cite Brahman as “without and within, unborn,” “That which transcends hunger and thirst,” and “Verily, this is all Brahman.” But how does this view relate to Atman and why is there no dualism in Samkara’s metaphysics?

Aside from Brahman, we must now understand Atman. Atman can be understood in terms of being an eternal universal spirit that when resident in a (supposed) individual person becomes the eternal soul of that individual. Or, in relation to Atman as a whole, a person’s soul equals atman, a piece of Atman, in a manner of speaking. This is not to say atman is a constituent of Atman; one’s atman is equivalent to Atman since there must be a principle soul from which living things can be infused with (what appears to be) their own souls. Any apparent division between the two is due to the power of maya, an illusion-inducing force which makes it possible for one’s atman to know the world subjectively. In actuality, each atman – which is any individual’s sought after true nature – is Atman as well.

But how can the individual’s ultimate nature be Atman if, as the pupil indicates it is written, that the highest Atman is “free from evil, ageless, deathless”? A student might ask how he can be Atman if he feels pain or other physical sensations. Samkara argues that something like pain is an illusion (again, due to maya); pain is perceived in our bodies at a particular location, not in perceivers themselves. If the perceiver (Atman) was the location of pain, we would point to our whole body as the location of pain. Moreover, Samkara shores up this view by informing the student of the locus of forms and desires as being “Right in the intellect.” Obviously, impressions and emotions have no physical location that one can point to as in the case of pain, so where could they be? In none other than that which is not physical, the soul.

Now Samkara can connect atman to Atman. Samkara has built a certain relationship between one’s body and their atman; pain is felt in the body, not in the perceiver, not in one’s soul. Samkara makes a similar relation between atman and Atman; desires and emotions are in one’s soul, but not in the eternal universal spirit.

Here, we begin to see what Samkara means by ‘reasonableness;’ he is pointing out what he believes to be obvious. However, in pointing out what he believes is obvious, he defers to the scriptural authority that identifies the perceiver with Atman. In the example of pain, Samkara appears to be well aware that there is some disconnection between a person’s perceptions and where they perceive something like pain to take place. Samkara may be correct that the perceiver is not their own body in which pain occurs, but there is nothing other than scriptural authority that equates that perceiver with either atman or Atman in particular, or that some other explanation can be ruled out altogether. Samkara appears to strongly defer to scripture in equating the ultimate perceiver with such quotes as, “He is declared to be unchanging” and “Because He is beginningless and attributeless.” Samkara treats atman similarly, writing, “Impurity [such as desire and aversion] is in the object and not in Atman [which is the subject] according to hundreds of sruti passages such as…” There doesn’t appear to be any true justification for Samkara’s view that atman and Atman are equal, simply that there is something strange going on between the body and whatever it is that perceives. Samkara can give that power a name, but this merely serves as a starting point from which we can begin to wonder what is really taking place.

But let us suppose for a moment that Samkara is right about atman and Atman, or simply Atman since they are not different. Most obviously, if we are to hold the view that Brahman encompasses everything that is seen and unseen, then Atman is within the sphere of Brahman. That is, if Brahman is everything, everything is also Brahman. Brahman is found in the physical world and the spiritual world (not that this division is real). Atman then falls under the umbrella of Brahman, so-to-speak, relating to Brahman in the same way atman relates to Atman – Atman is not separate from Brahman’s essence (if ‘essence’ were the appropriate word to use for that which has no essence). Just as each atman is Atman, Atman is Brahman. Not realizing this leads to what one might perceive as a duality between the two. 

However, as before, there really does not seem to be any particular line of reasoning that might lead us to this conclusion. Whereas we saw previously that the equation of atman with Atman required some leap of faith, so does it appear in the case of equating Atman with Brahman. Samkara literally fails to base his reasoning on logic alone, writing, “The scripture gradually removes his ignorance regarding this matter” which has the effect of indicating that any pupil of Samkara is going to have to read, re-read, and reinforce through a need to believe it that Atman is Brahman. Samkara ultimately sees reasonableness as what is revealed by scriptures, which apparently explains and solves the apparent duality between perceiver and objects and the interconnectedness of things. It may seem reasonable to observe and attempt to explain a world that operates in such a manner, and it may be correct, but deferring to scriptures on the matter does not lead us there. Where is the evidence? It is awfully convenient of the scriptures to hold that Atman or Brahman can be accounted for by evidence since the supposed evidence would be all around us and we simply have to realize it.

In conclusion, we should not think Samkara has any good justification (in the Western analytic philosophy sense) for his belief in non-dualism. In fact, his basic premise – that something strange is going on between the body and the perceiver – we can easily think actually argues in favor of dualism. It appears the only way for Samkara to make the leap from the apparent reality of objects and our bodies to their unity with the spiritual world is to defer to the scriptural beliefs in maya. Certainly, if maya is a real illusionary power, our extended world is not real and Samkara’s arguments are victorious. But too much rests upon scriptural reference in Samkara’s arguments. Where is his evidence that Brahman has no beginning or end or is “without and within, unborn”? Where is the evidence that our inner perceiver, our soul, is a manifestation of the Atman as super-soul? As indicated earlier, Samakara’s logic is found wanting. That being the case, he would need evidence to support his views, and this reader has found that evidence lacking. The conceptions of atman, Atman, and Brahman, all rest upon scripture, not from any independent arguments or experiences that indicate the reality of such things. ‘Reasonableness’ is not found by twisting scriptural references to fit one’s version of the truth. 

The Definition of God, Dammit (Part Two)

[Note: This entry is ancillary to last year’s blog, “The Definition of God, Dammit.”]

Does God exist? Before we can even attempt to answer such an awkward question, a universally acceptable definition of God is the most fundamental matter that must be settled. Whether or not any god can be said to exist will lie in our ability to define what qualifies as a god. If we are unable to define what a god is, then can God really be said to exist? How would we recognize God? Without a standard we can all agree upon for what qualifies as a god, we are faced with several prospects: That all definitions of a god are possibly valid, all definitions are invalid, or all definitions are at least worth considering because one may in fact be correct. Yet without that universal definition, we can’t be sure who is right and who is wrong. It may also be that God indeed exists despite our ability to define the extraordinary, but if we are unable to identify the qualities associated with a god as a means of recognition, then the whole concept of a deity existing in reality is rather useless if not downright irritating. Like elevator music. 

Can God be universally defined? Despite our seemingly advanced ability to communicate, we have not been able to adequately do this. Hindu's have a certain idea about what a god is, while Muslims have something entirely different in mind. No two religions ever appear on the same page (duh, otherwise they’d be the same religion). It cannot be the case that all concepts of God are equally valid because many religions exclude the possibility of other gods besides their god(s). What it comes down to is this: for a god to exist there must be one definition of what characteristics constitute the deity, so that we are able to identify God in much the same way we are able to identify a coconut, being that there is a general consensus of what the term “coconut” means even regardless of the language being spoken. With that definition we are able to recognize coconuts as being what they are. Either we have a term that identifies an entity or entities as a god or gods, or we do not. If not, the rational man cannot conclude God exists because you cannot believe in what has no definition^*. Feel free to become an atheist by default.

[* You might be thinking that if you were to encounter something you did not know the name of or have a name for, you could believe in the existence of something for which there is no definition. This is false. You may not realize it, but whichever one or more of your senses has perceived the whatever-it-is has attached certain characteristics to the whatever-it-is as a means of recognition. Only if deprived of all your senses would you not “recognize” anything.]

Is it the case that the idea of God is so incredible that the human mind (designed by God some would say) simply cannot define the word? That is in fact the argument of many agnostics. However, agnostics cannot show that this is not possible, merely that it just hasn’t happened yet. Hypothetically speaking, if a clear cut, unilateral definition of God were handed down tomorrow, agnostics would have to wrestle with that definition and come to a conclusion one way or the other. If the agnostic is going to suspend judgment about the existence of God based on lack of a definition, again, there is no practicality whatsoever in supposing that God might exist, unless the agnostic is accepting a form of Pascal’s Wager^**. If God actually does exist (ahem, citing a proper definition) I wonder if the G-man forgives such ambivalence.

[** From Wikipedia: Pascal's Wager (also known as Pascal's Gambit) is Blaise Pascal's application of decision theory to the belief in God. Pascal argues that it is always a better "bet" to believe in God, because the expected value to be gained from believing in God is always greater than the expected value resulting from non-belief. Note that this is not an argument for the existence of God, but rather one for the belief in God. Pascal specifically aimed the argument at such persons who were not convinced by traditional arguments for the existence of God. With his wager he sought to demonstrate that believing in God is more advantageous than not believing, and hoped that this would convert those who rejected previous theological arguments. The incompleteness of his argument is the origin of the term Pascal's Flaw.]

The problem is that even as great as our communication techniques are, they are often inadequate in explaining just about anything, object or concept, when you really want to be a prick about it. Asking for the definition of “X” is a time honored tradition among philosophers meant to demonstrate that an opponent has no idea what they are talking about. If a chair is defined as an object that you sit on that usually (but not necessarily) has four legs and back support, well then, lots of things might qualify as a chair. Lots of things might also qualify as a god, but if we’re talking about the “One True God,” then only one definition will do.

That brings us to “conceptual failure.” Have you ever had an idea that seemed reasonably clear in your own mind but that you found difficult to put into words clear enough for another person to understand? This doesn't make an idea automatically false or invalid, but without clarity what good is this idea of yours in the first place? A god may be well defined in someone's own mind, but that this definition probably has little universal acceptance implies a conceptual failure. For atheists this is not a problem; we don't go around trying to define that which does not exist. An ambiguous concept doesn’t exactly lead to credibility, folks.

Sometimes the problem lies with the words we use to explain ourselves. Words sometimes have different meanings depending upon the context in which they are used. For example, suppose I say to you, "I'd love to own a Jaguar." If we're talking about luxury cars the meaning of my statement is obvious. On the other hand, if we're talking about exotic pets perhaps you would try to talk me out of such an idea being that I can barely keep a house plant alive. On the other, other hand, if I’m talking about luxury cars and you think we’re talking about exotic pets, this might as well be an episode of “Three’s Company.”*** You see, context can be used to manipulate words to create all kinds of puns, double entendres, or plain ol’ confusion for the unsuspecting. Frankly, it's amazing that any one knows what anyone else is talking about. Arnold sure didn't know what Willis*** was talkin' 'bout.

[*** Showing my age here, folks.]

What we could really use is a language in which one word meant one thing regardless of context. Until then there will be no suitable definition of God, which is no doubt a great relief to the believer. After all, this will mean that God cannot be shown whether to exist or not and faith can rush in to prop up a theists’ righteousness. At the same time, though, the theist faces the dilemma that despite all the faith in the world, all concepts of God should be considered equally valid since prove their point linguistically. Though the theist appeals to faith in hopes that they've picked the correct religion with the proper definition of God, they cannot disprove anyone else’s definition of a god. That’s a mighty big hurdle to clear. What the theist is not admitting here is that really, they're playing Russian roulette with God. Well, go right ahead and blow your brains out guys. It'll be your defining moment.

Is The Universe A Simulation?

Human beings have longed to understand their origins. There are several theories as to why this is the case; maybe it is an attempt to nail down the disruptive thought that our identities are anything but static or that understanding our origins will clearly point out the purpose of our lives. At any rate, countless hypotheses have been advanced as to human origins. One of the newest (or at least the one that is getting a lot of press lately) is the hypothesis that the universe is a simulation run by an intelligence superior to our own. The details of this hypothesis are laid out here in this Discover magazine online article, though if you just want to go straight to the analysis of this poppycock idea, I provide snippets of the text below with a corresponding rebuttal.

The article starts with this gem, “To us, these programmers would be gods, able to twist reality on a whim…are the implications too disturbing?” Well, yes, the implications would be disturbing but not because we would discover these particular gods. In discovering these gods, we would still be inclined to ask who or what created these gods. So, discovering there are gods in this case doesn’t bring us closer to any ultimate truths. These so-called gods would still exist in some universe of their own and whose universe may be a simulation itself. (The article even acknowledges this possibility further on in the reading.) In uncovering these ‘gods of the simulation’ we would solve nothing other than to reveal our own slavery. Any ultimate truth would still be waiting to be discovered.

“Given the rapid technological advances we’ve witnessed over past decades — your cell phone has more processing power than NASA’s computers had during the moon landings — it’s not a huge leap to imagine that such simulations will eventually encompass intelligent life.” That’s a very humorous sentence since the definition of intelligent life is so contentious to say nothing of the fact that people often treat others unlike themselves as though they weren’t human. Do simulations qualify as intelligent life? I suppose we could ask Siri…

“Legislation and social mores could soon be all that keeps us from creating a universe of artificial, but still feeling, humans — but our tech-savvy descendants may find the power to play God too tempting to resist.” In other words, regardless of whether we are or are not simulations, we’d still be assholes. Great.

“John D. Barrow, professor of mathematical sciences at Cambridge University, suggested that an imperfect simulation of reality would contain detectable glitches. Just like your computer, the universe’s operating system would need updates to keep working.” This article began by mentioning the amount of computing power and intelligence that would be needed to create our simulation and it came off as sounding as if our simulators would be a whole lot smarter than the team that programmed Windows Vista. Barrow’s suggestion is pure speculation, aiming to suppose that our simulators would be as incompetent as we are. Well, I should hope not. After all, they kept blowjobs as part of the simulation. That implies vast intelligence.

“Most physicists assume that space is smooth and extends out infinitely. But physicists modeling the early universe cannot easily re-create a perfectly smooth background to house their atoms, stars and galaxies. Instead, they build up their simulated space from a lattice, or grid, just as television images are made up from multiple pixels.” Wow, this is exactly the same kind of reasoning that leads people to believe in miracles, events that supersede the laws of physics: If we cannot do it or explain it, then it must have been the Hand of God. Utter B.S.

“Unfortunately, our almighty simulators may instead have programmed us into a universe-size reality show — and are capable of manipulating the rules of the game, purely for their entertainment. In that case, maybe our best strategy is to lead lives that amuse our audience, in the hope that our simulator-gods will resurrect us in the afterlife of next-generation simulations.” First, a ‘universe-size reality show’ is still a smaller universe than the one our simulators are in, meaning, the size of our universe isn’t actually that impressive. Second, we have no idea what, exactly, amuses our supposed audience the most, since our simulators are eerily mum on that account. Much like (insert the name of your god here).

Other thoughts? As one commenter, Chris Pope wrote, “If we can conceive of any test that would prove that we are in a simulation then would not that possibility have already be conceived by the designers of our simulation? If the designers are able to respond to our actions and construct the simulation in such a way that we observe the results that they want us to, then how can we ever devise a test that can prove that we are in a simulation? Unless the designers want us to have that power they will be able to gimmick the results of any "test" such that the result returns to preserve the illusion of the simulation.” We don’t know how the simulators would react to us discovering we are a simulation. Do they want us to know? If we found out could they simply erase that knowledge from our memory? What if we rebelled against the program and would that even be possible? Moreover, theguy126 wrote, “Exactly what would define a real world as opposed to a simulation anyway? If we were to break free of our simulation and enter the real world what would be so distinctively different about that real world that makes it more "real" than a perfect simulation? The answer is nothing. There is nothing substantial about real matter because all that is just information that could have been simulated. There is no meaningful difference between a real world and a perfect simulation of the real world.”

It’s all speculation, folks. And if it turns out I’m not real, well, I’ll just move to California where it’s okay to be as fake as you want.

The utter nonsense of this hypothesis is relatable to solipsism, which I have defeated. Read about it here.