5 Irrefutable Proofs that God Does NOT Exist

As Christian (and other theistic) apologists enjoy giving ‘irrefutable’ proofs for God’s existence, I thought I offer up Proof of a Negative – in this case, that God (or any god) does not exist. Of course, I needn’t do this as anyone asserting a positive statement, such that X does exists, has the burden of proof upon them. Moreover, it is quite possible to prove a negative, contrary to popular belief. (Lookup the Law of Non-Contradiction for starters.) So let’s just get right to it:

 

1)     1-There is no universally accepted definition of ‘God’ – What are God’s attributes; how do we know God is God? Ask 100 theists for their definition of God and you’re likely to get about 100 different answers once you get past the Big Three. There will be some similarity in answers, such that God is anthropomorphic, is omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent, those last three attribute that when taken collectively cannot possibly be true due to contradictions. (For instance, if God knows the future, the future is preordained, which means God has no free will, which means God is not all powerful.) To know God is God there must be a definition that is testable. We can’t simply resort to “God is these things by definition” if such a definition cannot be observed. Even in the world of mathematics, one is one is not true by definition; we have to observe that is the case to know it is true.

2)    2- God is not testable – Not only is the definition of God not testable, in NO WAY can we sense God on a practical level. We cannot see, touch, taste, smell or hear God forthwith. Seeing or hearing God – when other people cannot – is tantamount to a hallucination. Likewise are mental states or emotional ‘feelings’ that God is present or exists. We know by studying brain scans these states or feeling are dependent on biological changes within the brain and body and do not correlate to any information we retrieve through our five senses. ‘Knowledge’ not derived from our five senses is not actual knowledge. Direct experience is the only way to actually know anything about the world, assuming our senses are not faulty.

3)    3- God cannot be told apart from a sufficiently powerful or knowledgeable alien – Let’s suppose some being came to Earth tomorrow and are from the planet Flobblebot, though they neglected to tell us where they are from. They know everything there is to know about the universe to the point of predicting exactly what will happen next and can perform any seemingly magical trick we ask of them, like teleporting us to the surface of the Sun and back without harm. Furthermore, this creature says they are the god of the Bible. Should we then conclude that this being is in fact God? That may seem reasonable but they really aren’t God since they’re from within the universe and not from outside of it as apologists often postulate. So we can’t know any ‘God’ isn’t lying to us, that they aren’t an alien. Any God could in fact be an alien who happens to have advanced power and knowledge.

4)    4- The existence of evil – Surely a definition of evil would be helpful here, unless we can agree ahead of time that something like the murder of a newborn child is evil. Let’s assume we do agree on that. If God is all-knowing, God knew it was going to happen and in not preventing it, is ultimately responsible for the evil since God is the creator of all things. If God could have chosen to stop this event and did not, God is not all-good. If God had a good reason not to stop the event – perhaps the child faced an unpleasant life if allowed to live – we should conclude God is not powerful enough to have stopped the pregnancy in the first place. We also can’t assume God’s actual reasons for doing anything as God’s mind is unknowable as I’ve so often heard from theists. (And, if it were indeed the case that God had a good reason for allowing the murder, this gives us a reason for allowing abortion.) If an all-powerful God wanted to stop a life of suffering, an all-powerful God could do so at any time but curiously never does – because God does not exist. If an existent God has a good reason for allowing suffering – maybe it creates mental and emotional resiliency – this should be stated in scriptures and continue in the afterlife. Never stop growing, right? (If the whole point of heaven is to live eternally without suffering, then it is reasonable to assume suffering is bad. Doesn’t seem like there is in fact a good reason for it.)

5)     5-Theists are often frightened by the prospect of death – If heaven exists why are theists ever afraid? If they are not sure if they are going to get into heaven, that indicates they are not compelled by the particulars of their faith to follow all the tenants of their faith and secure their heavenly reward: eternal life. A ‘true believer’ wouldn’t be scared by the prospect of the unknown – since they know about heaven – or leaving their family and friends behind knowing they are all going to meet again in the afterlife. A theist cannot be scared by dying as obtaining heaven is the entire point of believing in God. But theists are scared all the time. They have fears about death, they doubt, because subliminally at least they know they have accepted a falsehood. If heaven exists, a theist should not be scared by death or any earthly punishments. But they are scared. Ergo, God does not exist.

 

I hope you’ve enjoyed these ‘irrefutable’ proofs, some of which is a little bit tongue-in-cheek on purpose. Surely you’ve spotted an error or two on the level of “The Bible says God exists so God exists.” Have fun picking apart and kindly share your thoughts. Even after doing that it is still the case that no gods exist. Can you prove otherwise?

The Absurdity of the Ontological Argument

The Ontological Argument is accredited to St. Anselm (1033-1109) and is formulated as such: God is “something than which none greater can be conceived;” or, God is the most perfect being that can be thought of. Anselm adds to this formulation a caveat—if God exists only in our minds, than a being greater than God can be thought of that exists in reality. For Anselm, to think of something being greater than God is impossible since, for Anselm, existence is a requirement for anything to be perfect. Thus, God must exist; “And certainly it exists so truly that it cannot be thought of as not existing.”

The greatest weakness of Anselm’s argument is that the word “perfect” is ambiguous, if not altogether vague. Epistemologically, we cannot verify that any concept that anyone has of perfection is indeed perfect. If we argue that human beings are inherently imperfect creatures (as the traditional Judeo-Christian interpretation of human beings maintains) it would seem to follow that they are incapable of thinking of anything as perfect. If we consider for a moment that each culture has relative standards of perfection (to say nothing of individuals), it seems that the Ontological Argument could just as well be a proof for polytheism, not just monotheism. That is, the Ontological Argument is not an argument for any particular god. Obviously, in considering his own culture as more perfect that any other, Anselm never considered this as a possibility.

It should also not go unnoticed how it seems Anselm arbitrarily requires existence for something’s perfection, meaning, we don’t know if he’s left out some additional requirement or if there is a requirement more important than existence that he’s neglected to mention or think of. We cannot be certain that perfection requires a thought-of object to actually exist, particularly when we have no experience with perfect things in our own experiences (low standard for perfection notwithstanding).

Our lack of experience with perfect things highlights a lesser observed problem with Anselm’s argument, namely that for something to exist is to place limitations upon the existent object. While the Abrahamic god is often given as a being “without limitation,” no one has definitively defined what “without limitations” actually means. In actuality, it doesn’t mean anything because we have no concept of things that do not have boundaries. To do so is an attempt to conceptualize nothingness, and we characterize nothingness as the space between objects and their inherent boundaries.

Fourth, as pointed out by the clever Austrian philosopher Douglas Gasking, an ontological argument can be used to show that God does not exist:

1.  The creation of the world is the most marvelous achievement imaginable.

2. The merit of an achievement is the product of (a) its intrinsic quality, and (b) the ability of its creator.

3. The greater the disability (or handicap) of the creator, the more impressive the achievement.

4. The most formidable handicap for a creator would be non-existence.

5. Therefore if we suppose that the universe is the product of an existent creator we can conceive a greater being - namely, one who created everything while not existing.

6. An existing God therefore would not be a being greater than which a greater cannot be conceived because an even more formidable and incredible creator would be a God which did not exist.

7. God does not exist.

Lastly, we should consider our own existence and the existence of others for a moment. We exist yet we are not perfect. There is no reason to assume that any existent being who is more moral, more powerful, and/or more intelligent than us qualifies as perfect (even if they are closer to perfection as they exhibit these qualities). If perfection indeed requires existence and we know for certain that we exist, as opposed to a hypothetical god, it might be that we are more perfect than God by virtue of existence.

Solipsism: Finally Defeated

[Part Three of my recent investigation into metaphysics and consciousness in an attempt to defeat solipsism. As I’ve said before, it is important that solipsism to be defeated before any other philosophy can begin. While I’ve defeated solipsism on practical grounds in an earlier blog, and practical grounds figure into what I am about to present, the previous victory is admittedly hallow. So I began writing and writing until I came up with an argument that convincingly defeats solipsism. Given the answer I present here, I can look back and see just how much I – and others – have over-thought this problem, mainly because I – and others – initially refuse to accept the premise of solipsism. Solipsism cannot be defeated from the outside; it can only be defeated from within. Can solipsism be defeated? Yes. How? By accepting it. Please read on]

Solipsism is the name given to the idea that one’s own existence – particularly one’s own mental existence – is the only existence there is. Solipsism posits that there are no other minds besides one’s own and that the world of extended objects does not exist either. Although solipsism sounds nonsensical to the uninitiated, I and many others consider solipsism the greatest of all philosophical problems. There really does not seem to be a way to be certain that a world outside of one’s own mind exists.

To tackle this dilemma, it is necessary to accept the premise of solipsism rather than dismissing it simply because a world of extended objects appears obvious. [This assumes a previous acceptance of the idea that I am something that has experiences. And why not? It’s undeniable.] Upon accepting the premise, I – and maybe you if you exist – am inclined to ask some investigative questions, “Why this world and not another? Why would I imagine the world such as it is if I can imagine a better existence for myself? If I am all there is, what could possibly motivate me to perceive anything else?” Given my circumstances, it does not seem logical that my mental creation of the world would be coming from within myself if I have the capability of creating any world I want, assuming I even have such a need. If the world is my mental creation but I cannot create the world I want when I want, there has to be some explanation why not. And so I consider possibilities.

I can only think of one. Could it be that subconsciously I understand I am not ready for such an undertaking? If psychoanalysts, as a figments of my imagination, are correct about how the mind (my mind) works then certainly I have unconscious thoughts. But if I consciously wish that I did not have subconscious thoughts, why are they still there? (Well, I’d have to assume they are there; I can’t be sure if they are unconscious thoughts.) Perhaps subconscious thoughts are a reflex like breathing or my heart beating, but I have some conscious control over those reflexes even if I cannot stop such reflexes altogether. But what control do I have over subconscious thoughts? None and I cannot wish them away if they are there. But I do not consciously accept this explanation; I refuse to accept it on the grounds that I consciously assume that a desire for my life to be better is stronger than (and thus able to override) whatever subconscious thoughts that make or keep my world such as it is.

This Argument from Subconsciousness fails to explain why the world is the way it is if the world is a figment of my imagination. Problematically, I can think of no competing hypothesis other than the one I just presented as to how the world can appear as it is if it is created out of my own mind. Every other explanation I can think of as to why the world is the way it is even if it is all in my mind brings some other entity or element into the equation that must be outside of myself affecting my thoughts. The only way I can bring another entity or element into the equation that allows for control over my thoughts while still remaining a solipsist can only end in a self-manifested case of schizophrenia; that is, I – as more than one mental being – am controlling my own thoughts for undisclosed reasons. But then any such other mental being I am is stuck manifesting a world with their thoughts that I assume would be less than their ideal state, meaning, their situation is simply and likewise a variety of the Argument from Subconsciousness. Thus, this explanation is prone to the same flaw.

At this point I know that the world I perceive cannot be a construct of my own mind simply because of my limited ability to shape the world according to my conscious desires. I could be tempted to raise an objection to that statement and consider that the world I perceive can in fact be shaped according to my conscious desires, if only to a limited agree (that is, to a similar degree I have conscious control over breathing or my heart beating). My response to such an objection would be that I agree, but only in a manner of speaking: If I want more money, I can always work more or change careers or network with the right people, but changing the world in this sense is beholden to the laws of physics my mind accepts as real. On the other hand, if one is arguing for the ability to literally reshaping the world, defying the laws of physics to bring about changes, I would ask why are there limits to what my mind can do if it is my mind making the changes. I would much prefer to have an unlimited capability to reshape the world with my mind if I did in fact have such powers. Again, it’s the Argument from Subconsciousness which I’ve already argued is not a plausible scenario.

To be clear, what I’ve argued up to this point is not that my mind doesn’t create the world I perceive, rather I have argued that my perception of a world of extended objects must be driven by forces external to my mind since I have no reason to believe my mind, which can only be beholden to my will if I alone exist, would create the world such as I perceive it. I can certainly question where the sensory data is coming from that drives my particular perception of reality but it seems nonsensical to think that sensory data could be coming from myself considering my lack of ability to manipulate it. If it were the case that the data were coming from myself, I cannot imagine how or why that would be possible. It is much easier to imagine that a world of extended objects, with all its various qualities, encroach upon my sensory apparatuses (even if there is a sole sensory apparatus; the mind) to create experiences in my mind. While there remains the possibility that those qualities may be forced upon my mind, they are forced upon me from outside my mind’s ‘boundary.’ This doesn’t necessitate the existence of other minds per se, just that something besides my mind exists. That said, if I know something besides my own mind exists, I am no longer solipsistic and the existence of other minds at least appears plausible.

However, if there are in fact no minds other than my own, I can only conclude that I am God. Strangely, not a single figment of my imagination considers me to be so.

Update: 9/1/13

In promoting my blog on Youtube, one gentleman – a fan of philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein – strongly objected to my argument against solipsism, saying first that I was ignorant of the subject and second that just because I cannot provide an explanation for how or why my mind is the only existent thing, doesn’t mean there is a how or why; it just MAY BE or IS the case that my mind is all there is (a very Taoist argument, I must say). 

Since I am unaffected by his attempted ad hominid  attack, which was brought on by a minor slip in language on my part, I’ll get right to his second point. On one hand I agree with my detractor when it comes to the ‘why’ of possible solipsism. Asking ‘why’ something is the case implies a reason why I may be solipsistic (even if I don’t want to be) and reasons imply intelligence. The universe, were it intelligent, might ask itself why it is all there is. But the universe is not an intelligent being, insofar as we are familiar with the term, and thus to imagine the universe asking itself ‘why’ it exists is not a legitimate question. Now, just because I appear to be an intelligent being to myself or at least a sentient being does not mean I am either such thing. So asking myself ‘why’ my mind is all there is certainly may be a nonsensical question. 

On the other hand, asking ‘how’ I may be solipsistic is a perfectly legitimate question. ‘How’ is precisely what science pursues. Even Analytic Philosophy pursues ‘how’ things are (if not the ‘why’), demonstrating how conclusions are drawn from premises. But my detractor believes asking ‘how’ is a nonsensical activity also – at some point, he writes, you just have to accept the description removed from the cause (quoting Wittgenstein). So it seems this detractor believes that some things or events do not have causes or believes in a first cause for which there is no ‘how’ or explanation. The problem with believing that there once was a point for which no ‘how’ exists is indefensible; one cannot argue that everything has a cause – a ‘how’ – except for the first thing. Atheists certainly don’t let theists get away with that tired inconsistency of logic and I’m not allowing it here as an objection to my argument against solipsism. Worse, my detractor’s counter-argument is even weaker if he tries to say some things have causes and others don’t, implying he has arbitrary guidelines for what constitutes a cause and what doesn’t (or his definition of ‘cause’ is derived from Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language, which has its critics). I may not know the ‘how’ of my solipsism but the ‘how’ nonetheless exists as a concept within myself if my mind is all there is. Even if, supposing I am not an intelligent being or at least a sentient being, there is a still a ‘how;’ how is it that my mind is all there is?

So my detractor may be correct that my original investigative questions, “Why this world and not another? Why would I imagine the world such as it is if I can imagine a better existence for myself? If I am all there is, what could possibly motivate me to perceive anything else?” are off the mark. But if I replace ‘why’ with ‘how,’ where the ‘how’ is an explanation intelligible to myself since my mind is everything there is – thoughts, objects, other people, etc. – taking up solipsism is once again shown to be so convoluted that it shouldn’t be assumed that my mind is all there is.