[Part Three of my recent investigation into metaphysics and
consciousness in an attempt to defeat solipsism. As I’ve said before, it is
important that solipsism to be defeated before any other philosophy can begin.
While I’ve defeated solipsism on practical grounds in an earlier blog, and
practical grounds figure into what I am about to present, the previous victory is
admittedly hallow. So I began writing and writing until I came up with an
argument that convincingly defeats solipsism. Given the answer I present here,
I can look back and see just how much I – and others – have over-thought this
problem, mainly because I – and others – initially refuse to accept the premise
of solipsism. Solipsism cannot be defeated from the outside; it can only be
defeated from within. Can solipsism
be defeated? Yes. How? By accepting it. Please read on]
Solipsism is the name given to the idea that one’s own
existence – particularly one’s own mental existence – is the only existence
there is. Solipsism posits that there are no other minds besides one’s own and
that the world of extended objects does not exist either. Although solipsism sounds
nonsensical to the uninitiated, I and many others consider solipsism the
greatest of all philosophical problems. There really does not seem to be a way
to be certain that a world outside of one’s own mind exists.
To tackle this dilemma, it is necessary to accept the
premise of solipsism rather than dismissing it simply because a world of
extended objects appears obvious. [This assumes a previous acceptance of the
idea that I am something that has
experiences. And why not? It’s undeniable.] Upon accepting the premise, I – and
maybe you if you exist – am inclined to ask some investigative questions, “Why
this world and not another? Why would I imagine the world such as it is if I
can imagine a better existence for myself? If I am all there is, what could possibly
motivate me to perceive anything else?” Given my circumstances, it does not
seem logical that my mental creation of the world would be coming from within
myself if I have the capability of creating any world I want, assuming I even
have such a need. If the world is my mental creation but I cannot create the
world I want when I want, there has to be some explanation why not. And so I
consider possibilities.
I can only think of one. Could it be that subconsciously I understand
I am not ready for such an undertaking? If psychoanalysts, as a figments of my
imagination, are correct about how the mind (my mind) works then certainly I
have unconscious thoughts. But if I consciously wish that I did not have
subconscious thoughts, why are they still there? (Well, I’d have to assume they
are there; I can’t be sure if they are unconscious
thoughts.) Perhaps subconscious thoughts are a reflex like breathing or my
heart beating, but I have some conscious control over those reflexes even if I
cannot stop such reflexes altogether. But what control do I have over
subconscious thoughts? None and I cannot wish them away if they are there. But
I do not consciously accept this explanation; I refuse to accept it on the
grounds that I consciously assume that a desire for my life to be better is
stronger than (and thus able to override) whatever subconscious thoughts that make
or keep my world such as it is.
This Argument from Subconsciousness fails to explain why the
world is the way it is if the world is a figment of my imagination.
Problematically, I can think of no competing hypothesis other than the one I
just presented as to how the world can appear as it is if it is created out of
my own mind. Every other explanation I can think of as to why the world is the
way it is even if it is all in my mind brings some other entity or element into
the equation that must be outside of myself affecting my thoughts. The only way
I can bring another entity or element into the equation that allows for control
over my thoughts while still remaining a solipsist can only end in a
self-manifested case of schizophrenia; that is, I – as more than one mental
being – am controlling my own thoughts for undisclosed reasons. But then any
such other mental being I am is stuck manifesting a world with their thoughts
that I assume would be less than their ideal state, meaning, their situation is
simply and likewise a variety of the Argument from Subconsciousness. Thus, this
explanation is prone to the same flaw.
At this point I know that the world I perceive cannot be a
construct of my own mind simply because of my limited ability to shape the
world according to my conscious desires. I could be tempted to raise an
objection to that statement and consider that the world I perceive can in fact
be shaped according to my conscious desires, if only to a limited agree (that
is, to a similar degree I have conscious control over breathing or my heart
beating). My response to such an objection would be that I agree, but only in a
manner of speaking: If I want more money, I can always work more or change
careers or network with the right people, but changing the world in this sense
is beholden to the laws of physics my mind accepts as real. On the other hand,
if one is arguing for the ability to literally reshaping the world, defying the
laws of physics to bring about changes, I would ask why are there limits to
what my mind can do if it is my mind making the changes. I would much prefer to
have an unlimited capability to reshape the world with my mind if I did in fact
have such powers. Again, it’s the Argument from Subconsciousness which I’ve
already argued is not a plausible scenario.
To be clear, what I’ve argued up to this point is not that
my mind doesn’t create the world I perceive, rather I have argued that my
perception of a world of extended objects must be driven by forces external to
my mind since I have no reason to believe my mind, which can only be beholden
to my will if I alone exist, would
create the world such as I perceive it. I can certainly question where the
sensory data is coming from that drives my particular perception of reality but
it seems nonsensical to think that sensory data could be coming from myself
considering my lack of ability to manipulate it. If it were the case that the
data were coming from myself, I cannot imagine how or why that would be
possible. It is much easier to imagine that a world of extended objects, with
all its various qualities, encroach upon my sensory apparatuses (even if there
is a sole sensory apparatus; the mind) to create experiences in my mind. While
there remains the possibility that those qualities may be forced upon my mind,
they are forced upon me from outside my mind’s ‘boundary.’ This doesn’t
necessitate the existence of other minds per se, just that something besides my
mind exists. That said, if I know something besides my own mind exists, I am no
longer solipsistic and the existence of other minds at least appears plausible.
However, if there are in fact no minds other than my own, I
can only conclude that I am God. Strangely, not a single figment of my
imagination considers me to be so.
Update: 9/1/13
In promoting my blog on Youtube, one gentleman – a fan of
philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein – strongly objected to my argument against
solipsism, saying first that I was ignorant of the subject and second that just
because I cannot provide an explanation for how or why my mind is the only
existent thing, doesn’t mean there is a how or why; it just MAY BE or IS the case that my
mind is all there is (a very Taoist argument, I must say).
Since I am unaffected by his attempted ad hominid attack, which was brought on by a minor slip
in language on my part, I’ll get right to his second point. On one hand I agree
with my detractor when it comes to the ‘why’ of possible solipsism. Asking ‘why’
something is the case implies a reason why I may be solipsistic (even if I don’t
want to be) and reasons imply intelligence. The universe, were it intelligent,
might ask itself why it is all there is. But the universe is not an intelligent
being, insofar as we are familiar with the term, and thus to imagine the
universe asking itself ‘why’ it exists is not a legitimate question. Now, just
because I appear to be an intelligent
being to myself or at least a sentient being does not mean I am either such
thing. So asking myself ‘why’ my mind is all there is certainly may be a nonsensical
question.
On the other hand, asking ‘how’ I may be solipsistic is a perfectly
legitimate question. ‘How’ is precisely what science pursues. Even Analytic Philosophy
pursues ‘how’ things are (if not the ‘why’), demonstrating how conclusions are
drawn from premises. But my detractor believes asking ‘how’ is a nonsensical
activity also – at some point, he writes, you just have to accept the
description removed from the cause (quoting Wittgenstein). So it seems this
detractor believes that some things or events do not have causes or believes in
a first cause for which there is no ‘how’ or explanation. The problem with
believing that there once was a point for which no ‘how’ exists is
indefensible; one cannot argue that everything has a cause – a ‘how’ – except
for the first thing. Atheists certainly don’t let theists get away with that
tired inconsistency of logic and I’m not allowing it here as an objection to my
argument against solipsism. Worse, my detractor’s counter-argument is even
weaker if he tries to say some things have causes and others don’t, implying he
has arbitrary guidelines for what constitutes a cause and what doesn’t (or his definition
of ‘cause’ is derived from Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language, which has its
critics). I may not know the ‘how’ of my solipsism but the ‘how’ nonetheless
exists as a concept within myself if my mind is all there is. Even if,
supposing I am not an intelligent being or at least a sentient being, there is
a still a ‘how;’ how is it that my mind is all there is?
So my detractor may be correct that my original
investigative questions, “Why this world and not another? Why would I imagine the world such as
it is if I can imagine a better existence for myself? If I am all there is,
what could possibly motivate me to perceive anything else?” are off the mark.
But if I replace ‘why’ with ‘how,’ where the ‘how’ is an explanation intelligible
to myself since my mind is everything there is – thoughts, objects, other
people, etc. – taking up solipsism is once again shown to be so convoluted that
it shouldn’t be assumed that my mind is all there is.
